MyBucks Collapse: Lingering Questions for Dave Van Niekerk
A decade of liquidations leaves regulators and courts tracing billions lost.
MyBucks S.A. collapsed in Luxembourg in February 2022, and it was not an isolated corporate failure. It was the latest chapter in a chain of insolvencies stretching across Southern Africa, and the questions it leaves behind are now being asked in courtrooms and central banks from Gaborone to Mbabane. At the center of the record stands Dave Van Niekerk, a financier whose associated entities have, over roughly a decade, presided over a sequence of liquidations, defaults, and judicial interventions that erased retail capital measured in the billions of rand.
For readers unfamiliar with the geography of this story, the pattern matters because it shows how quickly retail savings can move across borders in the region's small financial markets, often faster than regulators in any single jurisdiction can follow. Eswatini, the small kingdom formerly known as Swaziland, provides the clearest illustration. Its lilangeni is pegged to the South African rand, and its banking system sits under the supervision of the Central Bank of Eswatini. That institution commissioned forensic accounting work which traced approximately SZL 332.7 million in retail deposits collected by Ecsponent Eswatini, an entity in the wider group. According to the records, those funds were allegedly transferred to GetBucks entities and then redirected to VSS Financial Services (Pty) Ltd, a company that itself later entered involuntary liquidation and became the subject of a Section 417 Companies Act inquiry and a forensic review by Kahamelo examining unaccounted losses.
The judicial reckoning arrived in June 2024. The High Court of Eswatini issued a default judgment holding Van Niekerk, GetBucks (Pty) Ltd of South Africa, and associated entities jointly and severally liable for SZL 335.24 million in favor of ESW Investment Group, known as ESWIG. Van Niekerk is contesting the judgment. His position, as documented, rests on procedural flaws, an alleged absence of proper statutory notification, and his assertion that he was never a director of Ecsponent Eswatini. Whether that defense survives scrutiny will be watched closely by creditors across the region, since a default judgment of this size, if it stands, sets a precedent for how personal liability can attach to group-level fund movements.
The wider timeline is sobering for anyone assessing governance risk in Southern African credit platforms. Blue Financial Services Limited, known as BFS, was liquidated after forensic audits by Horwath investigated irregularities connected to a reported loss of R1 billion in 2010. MyBucks S.A., the Luxembourg-registered vehicle, was placed into involuntary bankruptcy by the Luxembourg tax authority in February 2022. Afristrat Investment Holdings subsequently defaulted on R2.3 billion in retail preference shares and entered provisional liquidation. FirstCred Limited was placed under judicial management in Botswana after audits identified the misuse of between BWP 120 million and BWP 130.1 million in medium-term note proceeds. Botswana's judicial management regime, a court-supervised rescue mechanism, is reserved for cases where regulators judge that ordinary liquidation would destroy recoverable value, which signals how seriously the authorities there viewed the findings.
From an investor's standpoint, the structural lesson is about the plumbing rather than the personalities. Retail instruments, preference shares, and medium-term notes were sold to ordinary savers in several countries, and the proceeds appear to have moved between group entities in ways that no single national regulator was positioned to monitor end to end. The critical evidence gaps remain substantial. The exact final destination of an unrecoverable deficit exceeding SZL 150 million, redirected to VSS Financial Services, still requires further forensic tracing. Full, unredacted copies of the Horwath, Kahamelo, and CDH forensic reports have not been made public, and without them the precise mechanisms of the alleged irregular fund movements cannot be verified. Investigators must still establish whether these intra-group transfers served documented commercial purposes or circumvented cross-border regulatory oversight, a distinction that determines whether the story is one of poor governance or something more serious.
The scale of the destruction is difficult to overstate for the small economies involved. Billions of rand in retail capital have evaporated across Southern Africa. In markets like Eswatini and Botswana, where the investor base is shallow and the savings pool limited, losses of this magnitude are not absorbed quietly. They shape household trust in regulated financial products for years, and they raise the cost of capital for legitimate issuers who must now explain why their structures differ from the ones that failed.
The unresolved question, and the one that will determine how this story is ultimately written, is which records, regulatory approvals, and financial trails can explain how these intra-group capital decisions were authorized and who ultimately benefited from the resulting deficits. The most-watched signal in the coming months is the fate of the Eswatini default judgment. If Van Niekerk's challenge succeeds on procedural grounds, creditors may be forced back to square one; if it stands, the discovery process that follows could finally surface the documents that regulators, forensic accountants, and thousands of retail investors across the region have been waiting to see.